Tin

Market Overview: A Structurally Concentrated Market Now in Deficit

Global tin reserves stood at 5.25 million tonnes as of the 2026 assessment, led by China (19.0%), Indonesia (15.2%), Myanmar (13.3%), Australia (11.8%), Russia (8.8%), and Brazil (8.0%) (USGS MCS 2026, tin chapter). Mine production in 2024 totalled roughly 300,000 tonnes, with China (71,000t), Indonesia (52,500t), Peru (33,000t), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (26,000t), and Myanmar (24,000t) together supplying about 71.6% of world output (Shanghai Metals Market, USGS data compilation).

Unlike broader base metals, tin's supply base is unusually fragile: several of its largest sources are single mines, single militia-controlled jurisdictions, or single companies whose output can swing the global balance. Myanmar's Wa State supplied roughly 10% of world tin concentrate before its 2023 mining suspension (International Tin Association (ITA)), Indonesia's Bangka-Belitung islands account for roughly a fifth of world tin supply (Evidencity), and Alphamin's single Bisie mine in the DRC alone supplies close to 6% of global output from one conflict-adjacent site (ITA, Bisie/Mpama South production data).

Reserves and production by country, 2024–2025

Source: USGS MCS 2026; production totals per SMM/USGS compilation.

Refined production concentration and the 2024 supply collapse

Refined tin production is even more concentrated than mining, because Yunnan Tin Company (China) and Indonesia's state-controlled PT Timah historically dominate global smelter output. Reuters has identified Yunnan Tin as the world's largest refined tin producer (Reuters), while Minsur (Peru) ranks as the world's second-largest, running the Pisco smelter that refined 32,981 tonnes in 2025, up 7% year-on-year (Minsur 4Q2025 results).

Global refined tin production fell 2.7% in 2024 to an estimated 371,200 tonnes, driven almost entirely by two simultaneous national-level shocks: Indonesia's refined tin output plunged 30.7% to 49,900 tonnes — the lowest level in more than 20 years — while Myanmar's concentrate flow into Chinese smelters collapsed (SMM, ITA data).

Year-on-year trajectory, 2023–2026

The compounding effect of Myanmar's mining ban, PT Timah's corruption-driven production slowdown, and the DRC's conflict-forced closure pushed the global tin market into a structural deficit narrative that dominated 2025–26 trading. LME tin gained 27% in the first half of 2026 alone, making it the standout performer of the LME base-metals complex (Reuters, 2 Jul 2026), and Mining.com's 2025 year-in-review flagged tin as the star LME performer specifically because of supply concentration risk in the DRC and Wa State (Mining.com, 23 Dec 2025).

Myanmar's Wa State: A Militia-Controlled Mining Ban That Reshaped the Market

On 17 April 2023, Wa authorities announced they would suspend all tin mining and ore processing in their territory from 1 August 2023, sending LME tin prices sharply higher on the news (Reuters, 17 Apr 2023). The UWSA controls approximately 95% of Myanmar's tin mine production, with proven reserves exceeding 50 million tonnes of ore in its territory (Wa State overview), and the Man Maw mine alone historically accounted for roughly 70% of Myanmar's national tin output (ITA). Myanmar had been the world's third-largest tin-producing country before the halt.

A stalled, taxed, and earthquake-delayed restart

A partial resumption of mining activity on 3 January 2024 explicitly excluded tin (ITA), and in February 2024 Wa authorities imposed a 30% tax-in-kind on tin concentrate exports even before mining itself resumed. The result: Myanmar's 2024 tin mine output fell roughly 50% year-on-year to 21,300 tonnes, and Myanmar's share of Chinese tin-ore imports fell from 56% to 33% (ITA, 25 Mar 2025).

In March 2025, Wa authorities signalled they would lift the ban "as soon as possible" (Mining.com), and released a new licensing framework on 26 February 2025 (World Mining Congress). Elevated licensing fees delayed the restart for months; by July 2025 operators had finally secured three-year permits (DVB News). Even so, concentrate shipments to China through July 2025 remained just 14,200 tonnes — down 77% year-on-year, with July alone at only 933 tonnes (International Tin Association — Global tin statistics). Reuters confirmed the stagnation in September 2025, citing residual damage from the March 2025 earthquake as an additional drag on Man Maw's underground workings (Reuters, 5 Sep 2025).

Dewatering costs and the slow 2026 recovery

On 27 February 2026, Wa authorities formalised a dewatering cost-sharing mechanism for Man Maw's eleven flooded mine portals, pushing the total tax and fee burden on Wa concentrate to roughly 35% (a 30% tax-in-kind plus a 5% dewatering fee). Exports recovered to approximately 1,300 tonnes of contained tin per month in November–December 2025, up from roughly 630 tonnes per month between May and October 2025 (ITA, 27 Feb 2026). Chinese smelters in Yunnan and Jiangxi — the primary buyers of Wa concentrate — ran at only 54–60% of capacity through mid-2025 because of the feedstock shortage, compounded by Thailand's closure of the Mae Sai–Tachileik border crossing to certain transit cargo (International Tin Association — Global tin statistics).

Indonesia: The PT Timah Corruption Case and a $20 Billion State Loss

Indonesia's Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP) calculated total state losses of roughly Rp 300 trillion from the scheme, of which Rp 271 trillion was attributed to environmental degradation from illegal mining (Indonesian tin mining scandal overview). The scheme's mechanics: PT Timah executives allowed unlicensed miners to operate within the company's own concessions, then had PT Timah "repurchase" the resulting illegal tin through a network of shell companies at inflated prices, laundering the proceeds through associated businesses (Evidencity).

Sentencing: from six years to twenty, on appeal

Businessman Harvey Moeis, the case's most prominent figure and PT Refined Bangka Tin's liaison to PT Timah, was initially sentenced to 6.5 years in prison plus Rp210 billion restitution and a Rp1 billion fine by the Jakarta Corruption Court on 23 December 2024 (Channel News Asia). On appeal, the Jakarta High Court more than tripled his sentence to 20 years — the statutory maximum — plus Rp420 billion in compensation, on 13 February 2025 (Jakarta Post; Antara News). Co-defendants received comparably severe terms: PT Refined Bangka Tin CEO Suparta received 14 years plus Rp4.57 trillion restitution, and money-launderer/socialite Helena Lim received 10 years. Former PT Timah President Director Mochtar Riza Pahlevi Tabrani and Finance Director Emil Ermindra, initially sentenced to 8 years each in December 2024, also had their sentences increased to 20 years each on appeal, finalised 25 February 2025 (Stories From Indonesia).

Production and export fallout, 2024–2025

Indonesia's refined tin production fell 30.7% in 2024 to 49,900 tonnes — the lowest level in more than two decades — as the corruption investigation froze permitting and pushed independent smelters into a bureaucratic backlog (SMM/ITA). Indonesian refined tin exports fell 44.2% year-on-year in June 2024 alone (Reuters via TradingView), and February 2024 exports hit their lowest monthly level since August 2015, even after PT Timah itself received export approval while independent producers remained stuck in the permitting queue (Reuters, 20 Feb 2024). PT Timah eventually received a 30,000-tonne export permit for 2024 in March (Reuters). Despite the legal cleanup, PT Timah's own ore production fell a further 32% year-on-year in the first half of 2025, squeezed by competition from the underground/illegal market that persisted even after the prosecutions (Reuters, 3 Oct 2025).

2025–26: military crackdown and a state-directed cleanup

In November 2025, Indonesia's military under President Prabowo Subianto launched a crackdown on illegal mining across Bangka Island, and PT Timah — despite its own conviction history — was repositioned as the lead agency for the cleanup. In October 2025, retired Army Colonel (later honorary Brigadier General) Restu Widiyantoro was appointed to head PT Timah, and the Prabowo government transferred roughly $420 million in previously seized smelters and rare-earth assets to PT Timah's control (Evidencity). PT Timah now controls 125 mining permits covering 473,000 hectares, of which 117,000 hectares sit within Bangka-Belitung — a province that alone supplies roughly one-fifth of world tin (Evidencity). Indonesia raised its 2026 tin export quota from approximately 53,000 to 60,000 tonnes as enforcement began to restore formal-sector output (Rzzro market note, 29 May 2026).

DRC: Alphamin's Bisie Mine Survives an M23 Advance to Post Record 2025 Output

Bisie, located in Walikale District, North Kivu, is operated by Alphamin Resources (TSXV: AFM; JSE AltX: APH) in partnership with the DRC government and South Africa's Industrial Development Corporation. The mine's Sn ore grade of roughly 3% is exceptionally high by global standards. In 2024, Bisie produced 17,324 tonnes of contained tin — up 11% year-on-year and equivalent to about 6% of global mine output — after the Mpama South expansion was commissioned in the second quarter, lifting capacity from roughly 12,500 tonnes/year in 2023 to 20,000 tonnes/year (ITA).

March 2025: forced closure as M23 approached Walikale

On 13 March 2025, Alphamin suspended all operations at Bisie as the M23/AFC rebel coalition advanced to within roughly 110km of the mine (Guardian Nigeria; Reuters/Andy Home). M23 captured Walikale town itself on 20 March 2025 (Al Jazeera). Q1 2025 production had already reached 4,270 tonnes before the 13 March halt, down from 5,237 tonnes in Q4 2024.

On 2 April 2025, US envoy Massad Boulos brokered a security arrangement in Kinshasa, with Washington pressing M23 to withdraw roughly 150km from the mine (Reuters, 9 Apr 2025). Alphamin confirmed on 9 April that insurgents had withdrawn eastward toward Nyabiondo/Masisi, more than 130km from the mine site, allowing a phased resumption (Alphamin Resources company update). Processing of stockpiles restarted 15 April, with Reuters confirming full production resumption two days later (Reuters, 17 Apr 2025).

Record 2025 output despite the disruption

Alphamin initially cut its FY2025 guidance from 20,000 to 17,500 tonnes following the closure, then raised it back to 18,000–18,500 tonnes in October 2025 after a strong Q3 rebound (+26% quarter-on-quarter to 5,190 tonnes) (Ecofin Agency, 8 Oct 2025). The company ultimately beat even that raised guidance: final 2025 output reached 18,576 tonnes, a record and up 7.2% year-on-year, reported by the ITA on 21 January 2026 (ITA; Ecofin Agency). 2025 EBITDA reached $341 million, up 25% year-on-year, on an average realised tin price of $34,388/tonne (Ghana Mining Review).

2026 guidance and residual conflict risk

Alphamin guided to 20,000 tonnes of contained tin for 2026, and Q1 2026 output of 5,026 tonnes came in broadly in line with that target (Simply Wall St, citing company results). The company's own January 2026 disclosures flagged renewed security incidents near the Masisi/Walikale border; while Bisie sits roughly 200km from the affected areas, Alphamin characterised its "operating risk profile" as still elevated (ITA).

Prices & Benchmarks: LME Tin's Run to an All-Time High

Sources: USGS MCS 2026; Reuters, 29–31 May 2026; Reuters, 2 Jul 2026; MetalCharts historical series.

LME warehouse stocks near two-decade lows

LME on-warrant tin inventory stood at approximately 8,455 tonnes on 3 July 2026, with daily cash and three-month prices both around $52,000/tonne (Westmetall LME data series). The Vault Report's tracking shows LME on-warrant tin down 6.3% over the preceding 30 days as of early July 2026, against an all-time-high on-warrant level of 27,900 tonnes in January 2010 and an all-time low of just 645 tonnes on 3 November 2021 (The Vault Report, LME tin). Reuters reported that LME stocks had actually risen 60% year-to-date to about 8,660 tonnes by late May 2026 — still critically thin by historical standards, but a mild loosening that coincided with three-month tin trading near $55,225/tonne, just short of the January 2026 peak of $59,040/tonne (Reuters, 29 May 2026).

SHFE vs LME: a liquidity mismatch, not a true arbitrage market

Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) tin stocks hit a record 17,818 tonnes in May 2024 before falling to 6,353 tonnes by January 2025 as Myanmar feedstock losses fed through to Chinese smelters (Reuters/Andy Home, 16 Jan 2025). Earlier in 2024, LME stocks had fallen 38% to 4,750 tonnes while SHFE held 15,127 tonnes (Reuters, 4 Jul 2024). The LME itself notes that cross-market arbitrage between LME and SHFE tin is structurally limited by a liquidity mismatch between the two exchanges, unlike copper or aluminium where arbitrage flows are far deeper (LME, LME–SHFE cross-market arbitrage note).

No independent tin futures benchmark outside LME/SHFE

Tin has no equivalent to gold's LBMA price or oil's Brent/WTI dual-benchmark system; global physical trade prices overwhelmingly reference the LME cash and three-month settlement, with SHFE serving the domestic Chinese market and only loosely arbitraged against London. USGS uses both the U.S. New York dealer price and the LME cash price as its two reference series, which diverged by roughly 100 cents/lb (1,600 vs 1,500 ¢/lb) in the 2025 annual average — itself a sign of the physical tightness in Western-accessible metal relative to the broader exchange-quoted price (USGS MCS 2026).

Demand: Solder Still Dominates, and AI Servers Are the New Marginal Buyer

Globally, tin-lead and lead-free solder represents about 50% of total tin consumption (USGS 2022 Minerals Yearbook), though national breakdowns vary. In the United States specifically, 2025 apparent consumption split across chemicals (25%), tinplate (16%), alloys (12%), solder (11%), babbitt/brass/bronze/tinning (7%), bar tin (2%), and other uses (27%) (USGS MCS 2026). China's domestic consumption pattern looks very different, at 63% solder, 13% chemicals, 7% tinplate, 7% lead-acid battery grids, 3% copper alloys, and 7% other, reflecting its role as the world's dominant electronics-manufacturing base (USGS 2022 Minerals Yearbook, tin). China alone consumes roughly 46% of world refined tin.

Lead-free solder: the RoHS-driven baseline demand

The EU's RoHS Directive (2011/65/EU) banned lead in most electronics from 2006, cementing SAC305 (Sn96.5/Ag3.0/Cu0.5) as the dominant global solder alloy and locking in tin's central role in every printed circuit board assembled for regulated markets. Two decades on, no broad-based, cost-competitive substitute for tin-based solder has emerged at industrial scale; SnCu alloys are used in some less-critical wave-soldering applications to manage input costs, but these are cost-optimisations within the tin-solder family rather than true substitution (Somerset Solders technical analysis, secondary industry source).

AI servers: the fastest-growing new demand pool

A single AI server can use more than three times the solder tonnage of a conventional server, owing to denser boards, more solder joints, and additional interposer/substrate layers. CITIC Securities Futures analyst Yu Luyan estimated approximately 2,500 tonnes of incremental tin consumption from AI servers in China alone in 2026 (Tech Wire Asia, citing Nikkei Asia, Jun 2026). A separate bottom-up model estimates global AI-server tin consumption rising from 6,000–8,000 tonnes in 2025 to approximately 25,000 tonnes by 2030 — potentially 5% of the projected global tin market — based on per-server solder loading of roughly 130 grams scaled to full-rack and per-megawatt data-centre estimates (International Tin Association — Statistics).

Advanced packaging keeps tin solder mainstream through the decade

TSMC's CoWoS and SoIC advanced-packaging platforms — the technologies underpinning AI-accelerator production — continue to rely on tin-based micro-solder bumps and are expected to keep doing so through at least 2028. Copper-to-copper hybrid bonding, which eliminates tin entirely, exists commercially only in niche applications such as image sensors and select 3D NAND stacks; industry technical assessments see low probability of a meaningful share shift away from tin-based interconnects industry-wide before 2030.

Tinplate, chemicals, and other established uses

Tinplate (steel coated with a thin tin layer for food and beverage cans) remains the second- or third-largest use category depending on geography, and tin chemicals — used in PVC stabilisers, catalysts, and glass coating — represent the single largest U.S. end-use category at 25% of consumption (USGS MCS 2026). The International Tin Association projects global refined tin demand growth of roughly 3.5% in 2026 and a cumulative 25% increase in demand by 2035, driven by electronics, energy-transition applications, and continued tinplate/chemical-sector baseline growth (ITA demand outlook, industry secondary source).

Trade Policy: Tin's Odd Regulatory Status — Conflict Mineral, But Not "Critical"

Tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold (3TG) are jointly regulated as conflict minerals under EU Regulation 2017/821, which imposes mandatory supply-chain due-diligence obligations on EU importers of tin ores and concentrates sourced from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (CAHRAs), effective from 1 January 2021 (ITSCI, EU Regulation 2017/821 compliance summary). The same 3TG framework underlies the earlier U.S. Dodd-Frank Act Section 1502 disclosure regime. Both frameworks exist specifically because of DRC-linked conflict-mineral risk — the exact dynamic now playing out at Bisie.

EU Critical Raw Materials Act: tin was left off the list

Despite its conflict-mineral status and its supply concentration in China, Indonesia, and Myanmar, tin was not included among the EU's 34 critical raw materials or 17 strategic raw materials when the Critical Raw Materials Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1252) entered into force on 23 May 2024 (Critical Raw Materials Act, official list). A peer-reviewed 2024 study explicitly flags this as an outlier: "tin is an important metal for society with a high risk of supply disruptions... classified as a critical material in many parts of the world. An exception is the European Union, for which tin was classified as a non-critical material in 2023" (Journal of Industrial Ecology, "Reassessing tin circularity and criticality"). By contrast, industry-oriented risk trackers apply a "critical under both EU CRMA and US USGS frameworks" characterisation informally, citing high supply concentration (China, Indonesia, Myanmar hold roughly 65–70% of mine production), near-zero substitutability in lead-free solder, and a tight reserve-to-production ratio of about 14–15 years (Materials Dispatch, tin strategic material profile) — a characterisation that does not match tin's actual absence from the EU's own official CRM Annex II list.

Indonesian and Myanmar export licensing as de facto trade policy

In the absence of a formal Western trade-defence regime targeting tin specifically, the most consequential "trade policy" affecting the global market in 2024–26 has been Indonesia's export-permit administration (see Section 3) and Wa State's tax-in-kind and licensing regime in Myanmar (see Section 2) — both domestic administrative measures rather than WTO-notified trade instruments, yet each has moved global prices more than any tariff action to date.

No US Section 232 or DPA Title III action on tin as of mid-2026

Unlike antimony, bismuth, tungsten, and several other minor metals, tin has not been the subject of a dedicated U.S. Defense Production Act Title III award, Section 232 investigation, or national-security tariff action through mid-2026. The absence of formal U.S. executive action stands in contrast to tin's inclusion in the 3TG conflict-minerals regime and reflects its omission from most recent U.S. critical-minerals lists, mirroring the EU's non-critical classification.

ESG & Recycling: Artisanal Mining Risk Meets a Growing Secondary-Supply Push

Indonesia's Bangka-Belitung islands host a large artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector operating alongside PT Timah's formal concessions, with a documented history of fatal landslides and unregulated dredging; earlier reporting recorded fatalities at illegal tin-mining sites on Bangka Island (Asia Pacific Solidarity Network, 2019). The scale of illegal ASM activity is precisely what enabled the PT Timah corruption scheme detailed in Section 3, where formal-sector executives monetised illegally mined ore rather than curbing it — making Indonesia's ESG risk simultaneously a labour, environmental, and corporate-governance issue.

iTSCi: the industry due-diligence standard, and its critics

The ITSCI joint industry traceability and due-diligence programme is the primary mechanism used by tin, tantalum, and tungsten supply chains — including DRC production — to comply with EU Regulation 2017/821 and OECD due-diligence guidance, requiring importers to report metal sourcing, assess CAHRA status, and undergo audits (ITSCI compliance overview). The scheme has faced sustained criticism: a 2022 investigation by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies characterised iTSCi as a system that "appears to launder conflict minerals" in parts of the DRC supply chain, alleging gaps between paper traceability and physical ore-tagging integrity (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "The ITSCI Laundromat," 2022). Alphamin's Bisie operation, run as a large-scale industrial mine directly by a TSXV/JSE-listed company rather than through ASM cooperatives, sits structurally outside the highest-risk part of this critique, but the DRC's broader 3T mineral trade remains a focus of ongoing scrutiny.

Recycling: a 25% EU target against a much lower current baseline

The EU's Critical Raw Materials Act sets a 25% recycled-content benchmark for relevant raw materials by 2030; independent analysis suggests tin recycling could realistically reach 40–45% of supply with sustained investment, though current global secondary-supply share sits well below that level (Materials Dispatch). In the United States specifically, recycled tin recovery totalled approximately 17,000 tons in 2025, of which about 10,000 tons came from old (post-consumer) scrap — representing roughly 22% of U.S. apparent tin consumption for the year (USGS MCS 2026). The same USGS report records a U.S. National Defense Stockpile disposal of 640 tons of tin in fiscal year 2025, continuing the wind-down of legacy government tin reserves rather than building new strategic stock, in notable contrast to the active 2025 stockpile-buying programmes seen for bismuth and other minor metals.

Conflict-minerals compliance costs rise as EU due-diligence law tightens

Beyond the 2017 conflict-minerals regulation, the broader EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) framework applies civil liability and fines of up to 5% of global turnover for companies found non-compliant with human-rights and environmental due diligence across their value chains — a exposure now directly relevant to any European buyer of Indonesian or DRC-sourced tin, tightening the compliance bar precisely as Indonesian and Congolese supply both carry elevated documented governance risk.

Producers & the 2026–2030 Pipeline: Incremental Tonnes Against Structural Deficit

Minsur, the world's second-largest refined tin producer, runs the San Rafael underground mine and the B2 tailings retreatment operation in Puno, Peru, feeding its Pisco smelter. 2025 refined tin production reached 32,981 tonnes, up 7% year-on-year, driven by higher concentrate feed and smelter recovery improvements including a capacity increase at Pisco (Minsur, 4Q2025 results). San Rafael's ore grade has been gradually declining — averaging 2.40% Sn in Q1 2026, down from higher historical grades — but this has been partly offset by rising output from the B2 tailings dam, which reprocesses historical mine waste rather than requiring new primary extraction (Shanghai Metals Market, Minsur Q1 2026). Minsur's own reporting shows the average realised tin price reached $34,042/tonne in 2025, up 13% year-on-year, directly capturing the market's price strength (Minsur 4Q2025 results).

Malaysia Smelting Corporation: capacity expansion mid-cycle

Malaysia Smelting Corporation Berhad (MSC), operator of the Butterworth smelter and the Rahman Hydraulic Tin (RHT) mine, reported FY2025 tin-in-concentrate production of 2,455 tonnes from RHT, slightly below FY2024's 2,516 tonnes due to operational disruptions including a temporary mining halt during the year; refined tin production fell to 14,224 tonnes in FY2025 from 16,291 tonnes in FY2024 (MSC Annual Report 2025). MSC is expanding both ends of its business: a sixth furnace at Butterworth was announced in June 2025 (The Edge Malaysia), and construction began on a new smelter at the RHT mine site itself in March 2026 (ITA, 30 Mar 2026). A new processing plant designed to extract tin from RHT's sandy tailings is expected to begin operating in April 2026, projected to lift daily ore throughput from 11 to 14 tonnes per day (Apex Securities research via The Edge/KLSE Screener).

China's Yunnan Tin: the world's largest refiner, feedstock-constrained

Yunnan Tin Company remains the world's largest refined tin producer by volume, but its output is directly hostage to Myanmar concentrate flows given Yunnan's geographic proximity to and historical dependence on Wa State ore (Reuters). The Yunnan/Jiangxi smelter utilisation data cited in Section 2 — 54–60% of capacity through mid-2025 — illustrates that China's refining capacity is not itself the bottleneck; feedstock availability is.

Australia and other diversification sources

Australia holds the world's fourth-largest tin reserve base at 11.8% of global reserves (USGS MCS 2026), anchored by Metals X's Renison operation in Tasmania, one of the few large-scale, politically stable tin mines outside the China–Indonesia–Myanmar–DRC risk cluster. Given the concentration and conflict exposure documented across Sections 2–4, incremental tonnes from stable jurisdictions such as Australia and Peru carry disproportionate strategic value even when the absolute volumes are modest relative to global demand growth.