Last updated: 2026-07-06
China Export Controls: MOFCOM Announcement No. 18 Puts Samarium Under a Standing Licence Regime
On 4 April 2025, China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly
issued Announcement No. 18 of 2025, placing samarium metal, samarium-cobalt alloy, samarium
oxide, and all samarium-containing compounds and permanent-magnet materials under mandatory export
licensing — alongside six other medium and heavy rare earths. Fourteen months later, the
licensing regime remains fully in force with no expiry date.
1. What Announcement No. 18 actually controls
MOFCOM's Announcement No. 18 of 2025
lists samarium under three new entries on China's Export Control List of Dual-Use Items: category
1C902.a covers samarium metal (customs code 2805301910) and samarium-containing
alloys — explicitly naming samarium-cobalt, samarium-iron, samarium-nickel, samarium-aluminum,
and samarium-magnesium alloys — plus samarium-containing sputtering targets and, critically,
“samarium cobalt permanent magnet materials” as a named line item.
Category 1C902.b covers samarium oxide and its mixtures, and 1C902.c
covers other samarium-containing compounds and mixtures. The announcement states exporters “shall
apply for the license from the competent commercial authority of the State Council” and must
declare the dual-use control number on every customs filing; goods are held during any customs
inquiry (MOFCOM Announcement No. 18).
The stated rationale was “to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international
obligations such as non-proliferation,” and the rule took effect immediately upon issuance
(MOFCOM Announcement No. 18).
2. Seven elements, one basket, explicitly tied to magnets and defense
The April 2025 basket covers seven medium and heavy rare earths: samarium, gadolinium,
terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium
(Reuters, 4 Apr 2025).
Law firm Holland & Knight's summary of the announcement specifically flags that the samarium
controls extend to “metallic samarium and samarium-containing alloys (e.g., samarium-cobalt
alloys), samarium oxide and its mixtures, and compounds and mixtures containing samarium” and
notes the measure “is not an export ban, but rather an export restriction” subject to
case-by-case licensing outcomes
(Holland & Knight, 4 Apr 2025).
The European Parliament's own resolution on the episode records that China “started to enact
export restrictions on 7 of the 17 rare earth elements (REEs) and on permanent magnets produced from
these, introducing a system for non-automatic licences, and cited dual-use and security
considerations as justification”
(European Parliament resolution, 14 Jul 2025).
3. December 2024 precedent and the licence-processing bottleneck
The April 2025 samarium controls followed a December 2024 update to China's dual-use export
framework that gave MOFCOM, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission broader
discretionary power to subject unlisted items to export control, with extraterritorial reach
(European Parliament resolution, 14 Jul 2025).
In practice, licence processing has become the binding constraint: trade advisory Sourzi reports the
“licence approval queue at MOFCOM's Department of Foreign Trade still averages 47 business
days for first-time applicants” a full year after the rule took effect, with first-time buyers
waiting up to 90 days, and that applicants must submit an end-user certificate attesting the material
will not reach a military end-user
(Sourzi, 5 Mar 2026).
Industry newsletter DHIT similarly documents a “processing time of up to 45 working days”
and confirms MOFCOM's official position that “exports are prohibited for military
applications” and situations where the end-use or end-user cannot be reliably verified
(DHIT, 19 Nov 2025).
Why it matters: unlike the December 2024 antimony/gallium/germanium ban, the April
2025 samarium controls were framed around dual-use national-security review rather than tariff
retaliation alone, and they explicitly name “samarium cobalt permanent magnet materials”
— the exact product used in missile actuators, satellite reaction wheels, and fighter-jet
turbomachinery. MOFCOM's spokesperson position that applications tied to overseas military
end-users will not be approved makes the licensing regime a direct lever over Western defense
production, not merely a commercial trade irritant
(MOFCOM — China Ministry of Commerce (rare earth export controls, April 2025 curbs)).
Current status (July 2026):
MOFCOM Announcement No. 18 of 2025 remains
fully in force for samarium and the other
six elements. The Busan truce of 30 October 2025 between Presidents Trump and Xi suspended only the
separate, more sweeping October 2025 extraterritorial controls (Announcement No. 61, covering an
additional five elements and a 0.1%-value foreign-direct-product rule) for one year, through 10
November 2026 — it did not touch the original April samarium licensing framework
(
DHIT, 19 Nov 2025).
MOFCOM began issuing general licenses to selected Chinese exporters in December 2025, easing
throughput for pre-approved civilian customers, but the underlying licensing architecture is
unchanged and defense/aerospace end-uses remain explicitly excluded
(
USGS MCS 2026, rare earths chapter;
MOFCOM — China Ministry of Commerce (rare earth export controls, April 2025 curbs)).
Watch: whether the October 2025 suspension is extended past 10 November 2026, and
whether general licenses expand to cover defense-linked buyers.
SmCo5 magnets operate continuously to roughly 250°C while retaining ~85% of
room-temperature performance; Sm2Co17 grades extend that range to 300–350°C, and
defense-qualified ultra-high-temperature grades reach up to 550°C — far beyond
the ~150–180°C practical ceiling of NdFeB magnets, which is why SmCo cannot simply be
replaced by the more abundant neodymium-iron-boron chemistry in the hottest defense environments
(
Zhiyu Magnet technical comparison, 14 May 2026).
1. Why temperature stability makes SmCo irreplaceable in guided munitions
Samarium-cobalt magnets were invented in the 1960s at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base by researchers
Karl Strnat and Alden Ray specifically to meet military demand for magnets that would not
demagnetize under heat and vibration — the United States was the pioneer of the technology
before production shifted almost entirely to China by the 1980s, driven by China's rare-earth
deposits, minimal environmental restrictions on the highly polluting separation process, and state
subsidies
(The Asia Live, 26 Dec 2025).
SmCo's Curie temperature of 700–850°C and near-zero, sometimes even slightly positive,
reversible temperature coefficient of remanence in specialty 2:17-type grades gives guided munitions,
radar seekers, and inertial-navigation gyroscopes magnetic stability across the extreme thermal
swings of missile flight, engine bays, and reentry-adjacent environments that NdFeB cannot match
(DataDeep Tech, Sm2Co17 sintered magnet supply chain report, 21 May 2026).
Peer-reviewed materials-physics research on Sm-Co systems confirms that heavy rare-earth doping with
dysprosium or terbium can push operating temperature further to ~180°C in a modified alloy, while
partial gadolinium substitution creates temperature-compensated (Sm,Gd)-Co magnets with near-zero
temperature coefficients from −50°C to 150°C, and the highest-temperature variants reach
550°C versus a prior 300°C ceiling for conventional high-temperature magnets
(Chinese Physics B, Sm-Co high-temperature permanent magnet materials review).
2. Named defense platforms and systems
SmCo magnets are documented components of missile guidance and control actuators, radar seekers,
inertial navigation gyroscopes, traveling-wave tubes and klystrons used in radar and electronic
warfare amplification, satellite reaction wheels and antenna-pointing assemblies, submarine drive and
sonar systems, and torpedo propulsion electric motors
(DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
A 2022 case documented by Air & Space Forces Magazine and cited in supply-chain analyses found a
Chinese-origin samarium-cobalt alloy inside a Honeywell-supplied auxiliary power unit magnet destined
for F-35 aircraft built by Lockheed Martin, forcing a compliance waiver under U.S. specialty-metals
rules and illustrating how deeply embedded Chinese SmCo material had become in the supply chain for
the U.S.'s fighter program even after restrictions were legislated
(DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
The Asia Live's reporting separately names “fifth-generation stealth fighter jets like the
F-35” and “precision-guided missiles such as Tomahawks” as systems whose production
could have “ground to a halt” without a fallback samarium source in 2025
(The Asia Live, 26 Dec 2025).
3. 10 U.S.C. §4872: the statutory ban on Chinese-origin SmCo in DoD contracts
Federal law already bars the Department of Defense from acquiring samarium-cobalt magnets “melted
or produced” in China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran. 10 U.S.C. §4872
(formerly §2533c, added by Section 844 of the FY2021 NDAA and tightened by Section 854 of the
FY2024 NDAA) defines “covered material” to include samarium-cobalt magnets,
neodymium-iron-boron magnets, tungsten metal powder, tungsten heavy alloy, and tantalum, and defines
“covered nation” as North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran
(10 U.S.C. §4872, GovInfo).
The implementing clause, DFARS 252.225-7052, currently restricts only the melting
and downstream production stages (alloying, powder formation, pressing, sintering, magnetization),
but effective 1 January 2027 the restriction expands to cover the entire supply
chain for samarium-cobalt magnets “from mining or production of a cobalt and samarium ore or
feedstock, including recycled material, through production of finished magnets”
(DFARS 252.225-7052, Acquisition.gov).
A waiver is available only if the Secretary of Defense determines in writing that compliant material
of “satisfactory quality and quantity, in the required form, cannot be procured as and when
needed at a reasonable price”
(10 U.S.C. §4872).
4. The 2022 Quadrant Magnetics prosecution
The stakes of non-compliance were demonstrated by the prosecution of Quadrant Magnetics LLC, a
Louisville, Kentucky defense magnet supplier indicted in November 2022 for allegedly substituting
Chinese-origin magnets into DoD-bound components; individual defendants pleaded guilty in 2024,
Quadrant executive Phil Pascoe was sentenced in October 2025 to 19 months in prison after an earlier
trial ended in mistrial in March 2025, and the company agreed to pay roughly $1.33 million in
forfeiture plus a $1 million penalty
(DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
The case is the clearest evidence that DoD's China-origin magnet ban has real enforcement teeth, and
that qualifying a fully compliant, non-Chinese SmCo supply chain is now a legal necessity for
defense primes, not merely a preference.
Current status (July 2026):
DFARS 252.225-7052 currently restricts melting-through-magnetization stages; the full mine-to-magnet
restriction takes effect 1 January 2027, a deadline Congress already pushed back once (from 2026)
to give suppliers time to qualify compliant sources
(
DFARS 252.225-7052).
Electron Energy Corporation, the only vertically integrated U.S. producer of Sm2Co17 sintered
magnets, states it will reach full DFARS 252.225-7052 compliance for both NdFeB and SmCo by mid-2026
(
DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
Watch: whether DoD grants a nonavailability waiver for SmCo ahead of the January
2027 deadline given the current non-Chinese samarium supply shortfall.
Last updated: 2026-07-06
The US Response: DLA Stockpiling, DoD Equity in MP Materials, and a French Rare-Earth Rescue
The Defense Logistics Agency's FY2025 Annual Materials Plan lists a potential acquisition of
60 metric tons of samarium-cobalt alloy for the National Defense Stockpile — part of a
broader FY2025 plan that also targeted 300 tonnes of neodymium-praseodymium oxide and 450 tonnes of
NdFeB magnet block, but in the near term, the U.S. defense-industrial base survived on a decades-old
abandoned French samarium stockpile rather than on new domestic production.
1. The 200-tonne Solvay stockpile: an emergency bridge, not a strategy
When China's April 2025 licensing controls hit, the U.S. samarium-cobalt magnet supply chain was
rescued by a roughly 200-tonne stockpile of legacy samarium nitrate held in La
Rochelle, France by Solvay, the Belgian chemicals group that had abandoned rare-earth separation in
France as uneconomical years earlier
(The Asia Live, 26 Dec 2025;
DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
Arnold Magnetic Technologies' chief commercial officer Aaron Williams said plainly: “When China
announced export controls on April 4, our supply was sufficient for a year… But as months
passed, it became clear that more long-term solutions were urgently needed”
(The Asia Live, 26 Dec 2025).
Non-Chinese samarium sourced through this route cost five to eight times more than
Chinese-origin material, a premium the U.S. defense industry accepted in exchange for supply security
(The Asia Live, 26 Dec 2025).
Williams added: “Once burned, twice shy. We will be extremely cautious in the future, avoiding
reliance on any one country for critical minerals”
(The Asia Live, 26 Dec 2025).
2. Vertical integration: USA Rare Earth acquires Less Common Metals
On 18 November 2025, U.S.-based miner USA Rare Earth closed its acquisition of
Less Common Metals (LCM), a UK-based rare-earth metals and alloys producer and one of the last
remaining Western rare-earth manufacturers, giving USA Rare Earth direct control over the Solvay
stockpile's onward refining path
(USA Rare Earth press release, 18 Nov 2025).
Under the resulting supply chain, samarium nitrate is shipped from France to LCM's UK facility for
refining into metal and alloy, then on to Arnold Magnetic Technologies' U.S. plants to be formed into
finished SmCo magnets for fighter jets and missile systems
(The Asia Live, 26 Dec 2025).
LCM separately received a grant from DLA Troop Support and the Defense Logistics Agency specifically
to expand its samarium metal production capacity at its UK facility
(FuTu News, 29 Sep 2025).
Solvay's GBU Special Chem division president An Nuyttens called the arrangement a partnership “to
provide essential resources for high-performance applications, particularly in the strategic domain
of the European aerospace industry”
(The Asia Live, 26 Dec 2025).
3. MP Materials' Department of War equity stake and the heavy-rare-earth circuit
On 9 July 2025, the U.S. Department of War (the renamed Department of Defense) made
a $400 million equity investment in MP Materials, operator of the Mountain Pass mine
and processing complex in California, as part of a broader transaction agreement that includes a
neodymium-praseodymium price-floor guarantee and a $150 million DoD loan to fund new solvent-extraction
and ion-exchange capacity for separating dysprosium, terbium, and samarium by 2028
(SFA (Oxford), 11 Jul 2025).
MP Materials has committed under its Department of War agreement to producing high-purity samarium
oxide, and its Q1 2026 earnings call confirmed the heavy-rare-earth separation circuit at Mountain
Pass — which already produces a mixed samarium/europium/gadolinium (SEG+) intermediate
concentrate at scale — is on track for commissioning in mid-2026, generating a dedicated
samarium/europium/gadolinium feed stream alongside a holmium-to-lutetium-plus-yttrium concentrate
(MP Materials — SEC Filings).
MP's Q3 2025 call confirmed plans to “commence production of additional heavy rare earth
products, starting with Sm, in line with its agreement with the Department of War”
(MP Materials Q3 2025 results, 6 Nov 2025).
4. Cumulative federal spending and the stockpile ceiling problem
DoD's cumulative spending on establishing domestic rare-earth supply chains reached roughly
$540 million after the July 2025 MP Materials equity purchase, up from more than
$439 million spent since 2020 before that transaction
(DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
Yet analysts argue the DLA's FY2025 Annual Materials Plan ceiling of 60 tonnes of samarium-cobalt
alloy is a stabilization gesture rather than a genuine strategic reserve, recommending the National
Defense Stockpile expand its SmCo target “from the current 60 mt FY2025 ceiling to a sustained
200 to 400 mt rolling inventory, sufficient to cover 24 to 36 months of identified defense-program
magnet demand under a complete-cutoff scenario”
(DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
The USGS confirms the FY2025 Annual Materials Plan figures directly and notes that “information
for FY 2026 potential acquisitions was not available” as of the 2026 Mineral Commodity Summary,
meaning there is no public confirmation the stockpile target has actually been raised
(USGS MCS 2026, rare earths chapter).
Current status (July 2026):
The U.S. has no operating domestic samarium separation facility; MP Materials' heavy-rare-earth
circuit is targeted for mid-2026 commissioning and Lynas's Hondo, Texas light-rare-earth refinery
(partially DPA Title III funded) is scheduled to begin SEG (samarium-europium-gadolinium) stream
production in 2026 (
SFA (Oxford), 11 Jul 2025).
Until then, the French Solvay stockpile via LCM/Arnold remains the primary non-Chinese physical
source feeding U.S. defense magnet production.
Watch: MP Materials' mid-2026 heavy
rare-earth circuit commissioning, FY2026/FY2027 DLA Annual Materials Plan samarium-cobalt tonnage
targets, and Electron Energy Corporation's stated mid-2026 DFARS compliance milestone.
Samarium pricing is unusually bifurcated. USGS's official annual average, sourced from Argus Media's
FOB-China oxide assessment, shows samarium oxide trading in a narrow low-single-digit-dollar band for
years even through 2025; but Chinese domestic yuan-denominated spot quotes converted to dollars, and
the effective landed cost of non-Chinese material reaching Western defense buyers, show a far larger,
more volatile picture — underscoring that the headline USGS average understates the acute
supply stress defense-linked buyers actually experienced in 2025–26.
USGS annual average price, samarium oxide 99.5% minimum, FOB China ($/kg)
| Year | Price ($/kg) | YoY change |
| 2021 | 2.03 | — |
| 2022 | 3.34 | +64.5% |
| 2023 | 2.17 | −35.0% |
| 2024 | 2.01 | −7.4% |
| 2025e | 2.82 | +40.3% |
Source: USGS MCS 2026, rare earths chapter,
price series sourced from Argus Media's Argus Non-Ferrous Markets. The 2025 rebound to $2.82/kg,
a 40% year-on-year increase, is the clearest official confirmation that the April 2025 export
controls tightened physical availability even before the effect fully shows in official annual
averages, which lag spot-market stress. Argus's own historical assessments have shown samarium metal
(min 99% FOB China) trading in an $11.80–15.00/kg range and samarium oxide (min 99.5% FOB
China) in a $1.80–2.50/kg range in prior years, confirming the order of magnitude of the USGS
annual figures (Argus Rare Earths sample report;
Argus Non-Ferrous Markets sample report).
The China Rare Earth Price Index spike and the domestic-quote divergence
On the domestic Chinese spot market, industry tracker Rare Earth Exchanges reported the China Rare
Earth Price Index climbing to 237.5 on 14 January 2026, up 10% since early December
2025 and up sharply from an early-2024 trough near 150, with samarium prices quoted at
¥817–837/kg for oxide (roughly $114.20–$117.03/kg) and ¥350–370/kg
for metal (roughly $48.95–$51.75/kg)
(Rare Earth Exchanges, 15 Jan 2026).
These domestic quotes sit far above the USGS FOB-export annual average, reflecting both a different
purity/product specification and the reality that internal Chinese pricing, tight defense-linked
heavy-REE supply, and export-restricted flows have diverged. The same report attributes the broader
surge primarily to dysprosium (up to $878,000/tonne) and terbium (up to $2.57 million/tonne), and
specifically notes that “samarium's continued strength reflects rising interest in SmCo magnet
systems as a Dy/Tb-free alternative for high-performance and aerospace applications” —
i.e., buyers are substituting toward SmCo specifically because dysprosium and terbium (needed for
heat-resistant NdFeB) are even more constrained
(Rare Earth Exchanges, 15 Jan 2026).
The non-Chinese defense premium: 5–8x
For Western defense buyers sourcing outside China entirely — via the Solvay/LCM/Arnold chain
— the effective cost premium over Chinese-origin material was five to eight times
higher, a premium the U.S. defense-industrial base has been willing to absorb to secure
non-Chinese supply
(The Asia Live, 26 Dec 2025).
This creates a structurally two-tier market: a Chinese domestic/export price that, even after the
2025 rebound, remains an order of magnitude below the effective price non-Chinese defense buyers pay
once refining, qualification, and scarcity premiums are included.
Current status (July 2026):
USGS's official 2025 annual average of $2.82/kg is up 40% year-on-year but still understates the
acute price stress visible in Chinese domestic spot quotes and the 5–8x premium paid by
non-Chinese defense buyers. Watch: USGS MCS 2027 (due February 2027) for the first
full-year price read on the post-Announcement-No.-18 period, and Argus/Fastmarkets samarium
assessments for real-time tracking.
Samarium is never mined as a standalone ore; it is recovered as a minor constituent of bastnaesite
and monazite concentrates alongside the light rare earths (cerium, lanthanum, neodymium,
praseodymium) and other heavy rare earths, meaning its supply rises and falls with decisions about
the broader rare-earth complex, and separating it into pure samarium oxide or metal requires
dedicated solvent-extraction capacity that very few facilities outside China possess.
1. China's estimated 88–98% control of samarium and SmCo output
Estimates converge on an overwhelming Chinese share of both refined samarium and downstream SmCo
magnet manufacturing. Trade-advisory analysis pegs China's global refining share for samarium at
approximately 88%
(Sourzi, 5 Mar 2026),
while supply-chain analysis of the SmCo magnet segment specifically estimates that
90–98% of global Sm2Co17 sintered magnet production occurs in China and that
China has historically supplied over 60% of world samarium output
(DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
USGS's rare-earths-wide import data show that the United States sourced 71% of rare-earth
compounds and metals from China (2021–24 average), with Malaysia (13%), Japan (5%),
and Estonia (5%) supplying most of the remainder — though Malaysian, Japanese, and Estonian
volumes were themselves “derived from mineral concentrates and chemical intermediates produced
in Australia, China, and elsewhere,” meaning even the non-China-labeled trade flow is not fully
independent of Chinese material
(USGS MCS 2026, rare earths chapter).
2. Lynas Malaysia: the first non-Chinese samarium oxide producer
On 18–19 March 2026, Australia's Lynas Rare Earths announced it had produced
its first batch of on-spec samarium oxide at its Gebeng, Malaysia processing plant, one month ahead
of an original April 2026 target — making Lynas “the only producer outside China capable
of separating the three heavy rare earth materials samarium, terbium, and dysprosium”
(Shanghai Metals Market, 20 Mar 2026).
Lynas CEO Amanda Lacaze called it “a significant milestone for Lynas” that
“demonstrates the expertise and capability of our in-house team, which is unique outside
China”
(Malay Mail, 19 Mar 2026).
Lynas's own ASX filing states the first-stage output is expected to reach approximately 400
tonnes per year, expandable once additional heavy-rare-earth separation capacity is built,
and explicitly frames samarium as “a key component for SmCo magnets used in high temperature
environments”
(Lynas Rare Earths, ASX quarterly announcement, 21 Apr 2026).
The milestone followed Malaysia's renewal of Lynas's operating licence for a full 10-year term from
3 March 2026 (up from the prior three-year renewal cycle) and a 15 March 2026 binding letter of
intent with the U.S. Department of War covering light and heavy rare-earth oxide products, meaning
the new samarium output is likely to be directed into a defense-oriented supply chain
(Geomechanics.io, 20 Mar 2026).
3. MP Materials and the Mountain Pass SEG+ concentrate
MP Materials, operator of the Mountain Pass mine in California, has produced a mixed
samarium/europium/gadolinium (“SEG+”) concentrate at commercial scale for roughly two
years as an intermediate product, and confirmed on its Q1 2026 earnings call that its heavy-rare-earth
separation circuit — under construction for several years — is targeted for commissioning
in mid-2026, after which the company plans to produce dedicated high-purity samarium oxide under its
Department of War agreement
(MP Materials — SEC Filings;
MP Materials, Morgan Stanley Symposium transcript, 12 Nov 2025).
USGS confirms Mountain Pass, California is the sole primary bastnaesite mining operation in the
United States, with domestic rare-earth mineral-concentrate production of an estimated 51,000 tons
REO equivalent in 2025, valued at $240 million
(USGS MCS 2026, rare earths chapter).
Samarium content in Mountain Pass bastnaesite ore is estimated at approximately 0.79% of total REO
content, versus roughly 0.80% at China's Bayan Obo deposit — comparable ore grades, meaning
the supply gap is a separation-capacity problem, not a resource-endowment problem
(DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
4. Other announced non-Chinese pipeline projects
Ucore Rare Metals' planned Strategic Metals Complex in Alexandria, Louisiana, built on its RapidSX
solvent-extraction technology demonstrated at a Kingston, Ontario facility, is scheduled to add
separated samarium oxide output between 2026 and 2028, and signed a memorandum of understanding on 3
November 2025 with Vacuumschmelze and its eVAC Magnetics unit covering neodymium, praseodymium,
terbium, dysprosium, samarium, and gadolinium oxides
(DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
Lynas is separately constructing a light-rare-earth refinery in Hondo, Texas, partially funded by a
U.S. Department of Defense Title III award, designed to convert imported carbonate into NdPr oxide
and a dedicated samarium-europium-gadolinium stream, with first production for defense and commercial
offtakers scheduled for 2026
(SFA (Oxford), 11 Jul 2025).
USGS world mine production and reserves (rare earths overall, 2024–25, metric tons REO):
China 270,000t (2024 & 2025, reserves 44,000,000t) · United States 45,500t (2024) →
51,000t (2025, reserves 1,900,000t) · Australia 29,000t (both years, reserves 36,300,000t)
· Burma 27,000t (2024) → 22,000t (2025) · Russia 2,600t (reserves 3,800,000t)
· India 2,900t (reserves not available). World total rose from 380,000t (2024) to 390,000t
(2025e), with total world reserves exceeding 75,000,000t
(
USGS MCS 2026, rare earths chapter).
No USGS table isolates samarium-specific reserves or mine production by country; all figures are
REO-equivalent totals across the lanthanide suite.
Current status (July 2026):
Lynas Malaysia (~400 t/yr target) is the only non-Chinese samarium oxide producer with confirmed
commercial output as of mid-2026. MP Materials' heavy rare earth circuit and Lynas's Hondo, Texas
SEG stream are both targeting 2026 first production but had not yet shipped dedicated samarium oxide
at scale as of this update. Watch: MP Materials mid-2026 heavy-REE circuit
commissioning confirmation, Ucore Alexandria complex construction progress, USGS MCS 2027 samarium
production data.
1. Samarium-neodymium (Sm-Nd) dating: how it works
Samarium-neodymium dating is a radiometric method for determining the ages of rocks and meteorites,
based on the alpha decay of the long-lived isotope 147Sm to the stable radiogenic
isotope 143Nd, with a half-life of 1.066(5)×10^11 years
— roughly 24 times the age of the universe, which makes it suited to dating the very oldest
rocks and meteorites without the parent isotope being significantly depleted
(Samarium-neodymium dating, peer-reviewed geochronology literature summary).
Because samarium and neodymium are both rare earth elements with similar chemical behavior, the
Sm/Nd ratio is comparatively resistant to disturbance during sedimentation, diagenesis, and even
metamorphism — a key advantage over some other isotopic systems, which allows Sm-Nd ages to
survive geological reworking that would compromise other radiometric clocks.
2. The isochron method and the CHUR model
Geochronologists typically apply isochron dating, plotting the ratio of radiogenic
143Nd to stable 144Nd against the ratio of parent 147Sm to 144Nd across a suite of related samples;
the slope of the resulting line yields the age of the rock system. Where an isochron is unavailable,
researchers use the “chondritic uniform reservoir” (CHUR) model developed by DePaolo and
Wasserburg in 1976, which describes how the 143Nd/144Nd ratio evolved in chondritic meteorites —
thought to represent the earliest, unsorted material that formed before the planets — to model
the isotopic evolution of the bulk Earth and calculate crustal formation ages (TCHUR) for terrestrial
rocks. A refined “depleted mantle” model (TDM), developed by DePaolo in 1981, corrects for
the fact that young oceanic volcanic rocks plot 7 to 12 epsilon units above the CHUR evolution line,
producing more geologically realistic crustal formation ages — for example, revising an
anomalously young 0.8-billion-year TCHUR age for the Grenville orogeny's composite crust to a more
plausible 1.3-billion-year TDM age
(Samarium-neodymium dating, geochronology literature summary).
NASA-affiliated researchers have applied the same Sm-Nd system, often paired with rubidium-strontium
dating, to determine the crystallization ages of lunar and Martian meteorites and to reconstruct
early solar system chronology
(NASA Technical Reports Server, samarium-neodymium evolution of meteorites;
U.S. Department of Energy OSTI, rubidium-strontium and samarium-neodymium chronology report).
3. Neutron absorption: samarium in nuclear reactor control and burnable poisons
Samarium has an unusually large thermal neutron-capture cross-section in specific isotopic forms,
making samarium oxide (Sm2O3) a candidate neutron-absorbing material for reactor control and shielding
applications, tested via standard reactivity-worth measurement protocols in research reactors
(BenchChem application note, samarium oxide as a neutron absorber).
Separately, and more consequentially for reactor operations generally, the fission product
samarium-149 is one of the most significant neutron-absorbing “poisons”
that accumulates in operating nuclear fuel, alongside xenon-135, and must be accounted for in reactor
physics calculations of reactivity margin, since 149Sm (unlike 135Xe) does not decay away and instead
continues to accumulate until burned out by further neutron capture
(Nuclear Power, Samarium-149 production and equilibrium;
U.S. Department of Energy reactor physics training manual, fission product poisons).
Samarium-cobalt magnets are also separately used in reactor-adjacent inspection and maintenance
equipment because they retain their magnetic properties under radiation exposure better than standard
magnet materials, even though they are not part of the control rods themselves
(Rare Earth Exchanges, nuclear reactor control rods and rare earths, 13 Apr 2026).
4. Optical, laser, and catalytic applications
Lynas's own product description for its newly commercialized samarium oxide explicitly lists
“optical, catalyst and medical applications” alongside high-performance magnets as end
markets for the material
(Lynas Rare Earths, ASX quarterly announcement, 21 Apr 2026).
USGS's broader rare-earths chapter classifies catalysts as the single leading domestic U.S. end use
for rare earths overall (ahead of magnets, which lead globally), with other end uses spanning
batteries, ceramics and glass, metallurgical alloys, and polishing
(USGS MCS 2026, rare earths chapter).
Samarium-doped glasses and crystals have long been studied for infrared-absorbing and laser-host
applications, exploiting samarium's characteristic sharp optical absorption and emission lines, though
USGS does not break out a samarium-specific tonnage for these niche optical uses within its aggregate
rare-earth end-use statistics.
Not applicable: USGS's Mineral Commodity Summaries series does not publish a
samarium-specific application-share breakdown (e.g., % magnets vs. % catalysts vs. % optical), so no
primary-source percentage split can be cited here beyond the qualitative ranking (catalysts leading
domestically, magnets leading globally) given for rare earths as a whole
(USGS MCS 2026, rare earths chapter).
Current status (July 2026):
Sm-Nd dating remains a standard, actively used geochronology tool for igneous and meteoritic samples,
unaffected by trade policy. Neutron-absorption and optical uses remain scientifically established but
commercially minor relative to the SmCo magnet and defense-stockpile story that now dominates
samarium's strategic profile. Watch: none — this domain is stable and
non-time-sensitive relative to the trade and defense sections above.
1. Samarium's Critical and Strategic Raw Material classification
The European Commission's Critical Raw Materials Act, proposed as COM(2023) 160 final
and formally in force since 23 May 2024, classifies samarium as one of five light rare earth elements
(alongside cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, and praseodymium) that fall under the broader “rare
earths for magnets” Strategic Raw Material category — one of 17 Strategic Raw Materials
that sit within the full 34-material Critical Raw Materials list
(EU Raw Materials Information System (RMIS/JRC);
Intereconomics, EU strategic raw materials analysis, 27 Mar 2023).
The rare-earths-for-magnets category specifically includes “neodymium, praseodymium, terbium,
dysprosium, gadolinium, samarium and cerium,” explicitly grouping samarium with the elements
used in permanent-magnet manufacturing rather than with other rare-earth end uses
(Intereconomics, 27 Mar 2023).
2. The Act's 2030 domestic-capacity benchmarks and recycled-content provisions
Under the Critical Raw Materials Act, the EU has set 2030 benchmarks requiring that no single
non-EU country supply more than 65% of the bloc's annual consumption of any Strategic Raw Material,
alongside targets to extract at least 10%, process at least 40%, and recycle at least 25% of annual
EU consumption domestically
(Critical Raw Materials Act summary, European Commission-sourced).
The regulation's Article 28 provisions specifically empower the Commission to adopt, after 31
December 2030, delegated acts setting minimum recycled-content requirements for “neodymium,
dysprosium, praseodymium, terbium, boron, samarium, nickel and cobalt in the permanent magnet
incorporated in” covered products — naming samarium explicitly among the eight
magnet-relevant elements subject to future EU recycled-content mandates
(European Parliamentary Research Service briefing, 2023).
3. European Parliament's direct response to the April 2025 controls
The European Parliament passed a resolution on 14 July 2025 explicitly addressing
“China's critical raw materials export restrictions,” recording that China's April 2025
licensing regime covers samarium and six other medium/heavy rare earths plus permanent magnets made
from them, and separately flagging that China's licensing procedure “requires applicants to
disclose sensitive information to the Chinese authorities, which breaches economic secrecy”
and that China's December 2024 regulatory update gave Chinese authorities broader, partly
extraterritorial discretionary control powers
(European Parliament resolution, 14 Jul 2025).
A related European Court of Auditors report published in April 2026 assessing the EU's critical raw
materials strategy for the energy transition confirms that light rare earths (including samarium)
and heavy rare earths remain grouped as Strategic Raw Materials essential to green, digital, defence,
and aerospace applications, and cautions that EU domestic extraction, processing, and recycling
capacity for the rare-earth group as a whole remains far below the 2030 benchmarks
(European Court of Auditors, Special Report SR-2026-04, Apr 2026).
4. European industrial capacity building: Solvay, Neo Performance, and Vacuumschmelze
Europe's principal contribution to non-Chinese samarium supply to date has been reactive rather than
newly mined: Solvay's legacy La Rochelle, France samarium nitrate stockpile (Section 3) and
Vacuumschmelze's existing European SmCo product line, which the company describes as a
“principal SmCo producer in Germany”
(DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
Separately, Canadian-headquartered Neo Performance Materials opened Europe's first mass-production
facility for rare-earth magnets in Estonia in 2024, a step toward reducing the EU's reliance on
Chinese-manufactured finished magnets even where the underlying oxide separation still occurs
elsewhere
(DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
Current status (July 2026):
Samarium remains classified as a Strategic Raw Material under the EU CRMA's rare-earths-for-magnets
category; the Act's 2030 sourcing-concentration and domestic-capacity benchmarks apply to it, and its
Article 28 recycled-content provisions will apply from 2031 onward once delegated acts are adopted.
No EU country currently separates commercial-scale samarium oxide; Europe's supply security still
depends on the Solvay legacy stockpile and imported concentrate. Watch: European
Commission delegated acts on CRMA Annex updates due by 24 May 2027, and any EU-funded rare-earth
separation project targeting samarium specifically.
| Date | Event | Primary source |
| 1960s |
SmCo permanent magnets invented at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base by Karl Strnat and Alden Ray, explicitly to meet military demand for magnets resistant to heat and vibration. |
The Asia Live, 26 Dec 2025 |
| By the 1980s |
SmCo magnet production shifts almost entirely to China, driven by rare-earth deposits, minimal environmental regulation, and state subsidies. |
The Asia Live, 26 Dec 2025 |
| 2021 (statute) |
Section 844 of the FY2021 NDAA enacts 10 U.S.C. §2533c (later §4872), banning DoD procurement of samarium-cobalt magnets melted or produced in China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran. |
10 U.S.C. §4872, GovInfo |
| 16 Mar 2023 |
European Commission's Critical Raw Materials Act proposal, COM(2023) 160 final, classifies samarium as part of the rare-earths-for-magnets Strategic Raw Material category. |
European Commission COM(2023) 160 |
| Nov 2022 (disclosed later) |
Quadrant Magnetics LLC indicted for allegedly substituting Chinese-origin magnets, including samarium-cobalt, into DoD-bound components. |
DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026 |
| 2023 (statute) |
Section 854 of the FY2024 NDAA tightens 10 U.S.C. §4872, extending future coverage from “melted or produced” to the full mine-to-magnet supply chain, effective 1 January 2027. |
10 U.S.C. §4872, Cornell LII |
| 3 Dec 2024 |
China updates its dual-use export-control framework, expanding MOFCOM/State Council/Central Military Commission discretionary authority ahead of the April 2025 samarium controls. |
European Parliament resolution, 14 Jul 2025 |
| 4 Apr 2025 |
MOFCOM and GAC jointly issue Announcement No. 18 of 2025, imposing export-licensing controls on samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium, effective immediately. |
MOFCOM Announcement No. 18 of 2025 |
| Apr 2025 |
Arnold Magnetic Technologies confirms its samarium supply was sufficient for roughly one year at the time controls were announced, triggering an urgent search for alternative sourcing. |
The Asia Live, 26 Dec 2025 |
| 9 Jul 2025 |
U.S. Department of War makes a $400 million equity investment in MP Materials, including funding for heavy-rare-earth (including samarium) separation capacity at Mountain Pass. |
SFA (Oxford), 11 Jul 2025 |
| 14 Jul 2025 |
European Parliament passes a resolution on China's critical raw materials export restrictions, addressing the April 2025 samarium-inclusive controls directly. |
European Parliament resolution, 14 Jul 2025 |
| Oct 2025 |
China expands export controls (Announcement No. 61) to add europium, holmium, erbium, thulium, and ytterbium, plus a 0.1%-value foreign-direct-product rule; samarium remains under the original April framework. |
USGS MCS 2026, rare earths chapter |
| 30 Oct 2025 |
Trump-Xi Busan summit results in a one-year suspension (through 10 Nov 2026) of the October 2025 controls; the April samarium licensing regime is not suspended. |
DHIT, 19 Nov 2025 |
| 3 Nov 2025 |
Ucore Rare Metals signs MOU with Vacuumschmelze/eVAC Magnetics covering future samarium, gadolinium, and other rare-earth oxide supply from its planned Louisiana complex. |
DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026 |
| 18 Nov 2025 |
USA Rare Earth closes its acquisition of Less Common Metals (UK), gaining control of the refining path for the Solvay legacy samarium stockpile. |
USA Rare Earth press release, 18 Nov 2025 |
| Dec 2025 |
MOFCOM begins issuing general export licenses to selected Chinese exporters, easing throughput for pre-approved civilian buyers while defense-linked applications remain excluded. |
MOFCOM — China Ministry of Commerce (rare earth export controls, April 2025 curbs) |
| Oct 2025 sentencing / Mar 2025 mistrial |
Quadrant Magnetics executive Phil Pascoe sentenced to 19 months in prison in October 2025 after a March 2025 mistrial; company pays roughly $2.33 million in forfeiture and penalties. |
DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026 |
| 14 Jan 2026 |
China Rare Earth Price Index climbs to 237.5; samarium oxide quoted at ¥817–837/kg domestically, with continued strength attributed partly to demand for SmCo as a dysprosium/terbium-free substitute. |
Rare Earth Exchanges, 15 Jan 2026 |
| 18–19 Mar 2026 |
Lynas Rare Earths produces first on-spec samarium oxide at its Malaysia plant, one month ahead of schedule, becoming the only non-Chinese commercial samarium oxide producer. |
Malay Mail, 19 Mar 2026 |
| 7 May 2026 |
MP Materials confirms on its Q1 2026 earnings call that its heavy-rare-earth separation circuit, targeting samarium oxide production under its Department of War agreement, remains on track for mid-2026 commissioning. |
MP Materials — SEC Filings |
| 2026 (current) |
MOFCOM Announcement No. 18 remains fully in force; China retains an estimated 88–98% share of global samarium/SmCo output; non-Chinese defense buyers pay a 5–8x premium for material sourced via the Solvay/LCM/Arnold chain; DFARS 252.225-7052's full mine-to-magnet restriction takes effect 1 January 2027. |
USGS MCS 2026, rare earths chapter |
What the timeline shows: samarium's transformation from a low-profile,
low-priced magnet input into a defense-stockpile priority happened in two distinct phases — a
slow-burn legal phase (2021–2023 NDAA provisions banning Chinese-origin SmCo from DoD contracts,
years before China restricted exports) followed by a fast supply shock (the April 2025 MOFCOM
licensing regime, which forced the U.S. defense-industrial base to lean on a decades-old, previously
uneconomic French stockpile within weeks). Unlike bismuth or antimony, samarium's Western response
combines emergency stockpile improvisation (the Solvay/LCM/Arnold chain) with genuine new domestic
separation capacity (Lynas Malaysia, MP Materials Mountain Pass) reaching first production in the
same 12-month window — a faster capacity build-out than most other China-controlled critical
minerals have achieved to date.
Active — licensing regime in force, non-Chinese capacity still ramping, no resolution date set
1. Capacity pipeline: three projects, one 2026 inflection point
Three separate non-Chinese samarium production paths are converging on 2026: Lynas Malaysia's
confirmed ~400 tonne/year samarium oxide capacity (already in production as of March 2026), MP
Materials' Mountain Pass heavy-rare-earth circuit (targeting mid-2026 commissioning), and Lynas's
Hondo, Texas SEG stream (targeting 2026 first production)
(Lynas Rare Earths, ASX quarterly announcement, 21 Apr 2026;
MP Materials — SEC Filings;
SFA (Oxford), 11 Jul 2025).
Ucore's Louisiana complex adds a further, later-stage (2026–2028) source
(DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
Even taken together, these projects represent a small fraction of the estimated multi-thousand-tonne
global samarium market implied by China's historical 60%+ output share and hundreds-of-tonnes-per-year
Chinese domestic demand figures (162 tonnes in 2011, rising to 726 tonnes in 2020, per industry
research cited in supply-chain analysis), meaning even a fully successful non-Chinese build-out will
likely leave the West import-dependent on China for the bulk of global samarium supply through the
end of this decade
(DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
2. The DFARS 2027 deadline as a forcing function
The 1 January 2027 effective date for DFARS 252.225-7052's full mine-to-magnet restriction on
Chinese-origin samarium-cobalt magnets creates a hard compliance deadline that will force U.S.
defense primes to either qualify fully non-Chinese SmCo supply chains or seek nonavailability waivers
(DFARS 252.225-7052, Acquisition.gov).
Industry qualification cycles for new SmCo suppliers or grades typically run 18 to 36 months for
existing platforms and 3 to 7 years for entirely new platforms, according to supply-chain analysis
— meaning many defense programs starting qualification only after the April 2025 shock will not
complete the process before the January 2027 deadline, likely forcing widespread use of the statutory
waiver provision in the near term
(DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
3. Substitution limits: why NdFeB cannot simply replace SmCo
Even with dysprosium and terbium doping, NdFeB magnets max out at a practical continuous operating
temperature well below SmCo's range, and NdFeB's own heavy-rare-earth dopants (dysprosium, terbium)
are separately subject to the same April 2025 Chinese export-licensing regime, meaning the
“substitute” pathway is itself exposed to the same China dependency
(SDM Magnetics, SmCo vs NdFeB technical guide, 27 Sep 2024).
This is precisely why Rare Earth Exchanges reports rising interest in SmCo as a
“Dy/Tb-free alternative” even as samarium's own price climbs — buyers are choosing
the lesser of two supply-constrained options rather than escaping China exposure altogether
(Rare Earth Exchanges, 15 Jan 2026).
4. Demand scenarios: defense stockpiling versus civilian growth
Supply-chain analysis estimates defense and aerospace applications already account for roughly
38–45% of SmCo magnet demand, with industrial high-temperature motors and sensors (25–30%),
medical imaging (15–20%), and oil-and-gas downhole tools (5–10%) making up the remainder
(DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
Under a base-case scenario, continued DLA stockpile purchases, DFARS-driven qualification spending,
and MP Materials/Lynas capacity ramp should incrementally reduce — but not eliminate —
China dependency by 2028–2030, consistent with the recommendation that a 200–400 tonne
rolling SmCo stockpile could cover 24 to 36 months of defense-program demand under a complete-cutoff
scenario
(DataDeep Tech, 21 May 2026).
The principal downside risk is the November 2026 expiry of the Busan truce's suspension of the
broader October 2025 controls: if that suspension lapses, extraterritorial rules requiring a Chinese
export license for any product worldwide containing more than 0.1% Chinese-origin rare-earth content
by value would resume, compounding the existing April 2025 samarium licensing regime and further
tightening the squeeze on non-Chinese magnet producers who still rely on any Chinese-origin
intermediate inputs
(MOFCOM — China Ministry of Commerce (rare earth export controls, April 2025 curbs)).
Current status (July 2026):
Non-Chinese samarium supply is scaling faster than for most other China-controlled critical minerals,
but from a near-zero base, and remains a small fraction of global demand. The 1 January 2027 DFARS
deadline and the 10 November 2026 expiry of the October-2025-controls suspension are the two nearest
binary risk events. Watch: MP Materials mid-2026 heavy-REE circuit commissioning
confirmation, DoD nonavailability waiver filings for SmCo ahead of January 2027, and whether Beijing
extends or lets lapse the Busan truce suspension in November 2026.